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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 13-3667 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
FREDERICK BENTON, 
                       Appellant 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-13-cr-00265-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable William H. Walls 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 May 20, 2014 
 
BEFORE:  McKEE, Chief Judge, CHAGARES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: October 23, 2014 ) 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
___________ 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Frederick Benton pleaded guilty to distributing 100 grams or more of 
heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§  841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  Benton 
and the Government stipulated to a total offense level of 23 and further agreed that 
neither party would request an upward or downward departure, adjustment, or variance.  
The parties further agreed to the reasonableness of any sentence that fell within the 
Guidelines range appropriate for the stipulated offense level.  The plea agreement also 
contained an appellate waiver provision by which Benton agreed not to appeal his 
sentence as long as it fell within or below the Guideline’s range applicable to an offense 
level of 23.  This appellate waiver excluded, however, any appeal from the District 
Court’s calculation of Benton’s criminal history category. 
 After a comprehensive colloquy, the District Court accepted Benton’s plea of 
guilty.  Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence 
Investigation Report and Sentencing Memorandum.  The Probation Office calculated 
Benton’s total offense level to be 23 (which the parties had previously agreed to), and 
assigned him nine criminal history points based on prior criminal convictions.1  Benton 
objected to 8 of the 9 proposed criminal history points.  He argued that his state 
convictions were improperly counted for various reasons.  For example, Benton 
maintained that one of his New York convictions was based on an improperly amended 
                                              
1 Benton was assessed three criminal history points for a 1989 conviction in Alabama, 
three points for a 2000 conviction in New York, two points for another New York 
conviction in 2000 (which was referred to in the District Court as a “1999” conviction, 
apparently using the date of arrest, not conviction),  and one criminal history point for a 
2008 New York conviction.   
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indictment.  Benton also argued that another New York conviction should not have been 
counted against him because “it would have been beyond the ten year time limit,” if it 
had “been resolved in a more expeditious fashion.”  Benton also claims this same 
conviction was the result of a “coercive atmosphere.”  Benton lastly challenged his 
conviction from Alabama, arguing it was based on “insufficient, nonhearsay proof,” and 
that the Alabama case against him was closed until he turned himself in to the Alabama 
authorities. 
 The Government argued that Benton’s prior convictions were all entitled to a 
presumption of regularity.  The District Court, after reviewing Benton’s arguments with 
counsel in open court, agreed with the Government.  Benton’s criminal history was 
pegged at Category IV.  Using the total offense level of 23, the resulting Guidelines range 
was 70-87 months’ imprisonment.  The District Court next discussed its sentencing 
rationale, and sentenced Benton to 70 months, which was the bottom of the suggested 
Guidelines range.  Pursuant to the exception stated in his appellate waiver, Benton 
appealed the District Court’s calculation of his criminal history 
  We apply a presumption of regularity to court proceedings.  See United States v. 
Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 698 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that, absent evidence to the contrary, 
court proceedings are presumed to be procedurally proper).  On appeal, Benton contends 
that the District Court erred in adding points to his criminal history calculation for his 
prior convictions in New York.  He argues that the previous New York convictions were 
based on involuntary guilty pleas and that he was deprived of the effective assistance of 
counsel during those proceedings.   
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 In Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994), the United States Supreme Court 
held that, with the exception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel as 
described in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), a defendant in a federal 
sentencing proceeding has no right to collaterally attack the validity of previous state 
convictions which are used to enhance the federal sentence.  Id. at 497; United States v. 
Escobales, 218 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2000).  Benton never challenged his guilty plea as 
involuntary in the New York courts or federal habeas proceedings.  Nor did he ever claim 
that he has a statutory right to make such a challenge or that a particular sentencing 
guideline gives him the right to raise such a claim now.  Further, he has not raised any 
claim on appeal that his right to counsel under Gideon was violated.  For that very reason, 
Benton cannot now collaterally attack his New York convictions which the District Court 
used to enhance his federal sentence.  If Benton had wished to challenge the 
constitutionality of his New York convictions, he had to do so in that state’s courts.  
Since he did not, the District Court correctly added criminal history points for Benton’s 
prior convictions in New York.   
 To the extent Benton attempts to challenge the reasonableness of the District 
Court’s sentence, the plea agreement’s appellate waiver forecloses any review by this 
court.  Benton agreed to waive any appeal of his sentence if it “fell within or below the 
Guideline’s range that results from the agreed total Guidelines offense level of 23.”  The 
District Court sentenced Benton to 70 months--a sentence within the Guidelines range.  
His waiver, therefore, is valid unless he can demonstrate it was not knowing or voluntary 
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or that his waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.  Benton cannot make such a 
showing on this record.   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence imposed by the 
District Court.  
